Can a Sentencing Judge Deny the Possibility of Rehabilitation an
DEVELOPMENTS IN VERMONT LAW
By Kimberly B. Cheney
Can a Sentencing Judge Deny the Possibility of Rehabilitation and Early Release to a Prisoner?
A homeowner called police to complain of loud noises in the street. Police arrived. They found Delaoz outside the home. He told police he was responsible. He also accidentally dropped a dollar bill on the ground in front of the officer. The bill was folded into a small pouch, which the officer recognized as a common method of carrying illegal drugs, known as a “bindle.” He was convicted of felony cocaine possession. He was sentenced to a minimum of four years and eleven months in prison and a maximum of five years. He appealed, claiming illegal search, violations of Miranda, and illegal sentencing.
The Supreme Court rejected all Delaoz’s claims except that of illegal sentencing. During sentencing the Judge stated she was familiar with drug dealers because she was a former drug prosecutor, and although Delaoz was charged with possession, using “bindles” was characteristic of sellers. The Judge also stated that Delaoz was unlikely to be rehabilitated because of a long history of criminal behavior even though he successfully completed a rehab program. Accordingly, rehabilitation was not a reasonable goal of sentencing, hence the approximately equal minimum and maximum sentence.
Vermont law gives a sentencing Judge wide discretion, the Court ruled. It was not illegal for the Judge to use her own experience as a drug prosecutor to determine Delaoz was a seller. It is neither possible, nor desirable for a Judge to decide cases in a vacuum as though she had no experience, the Court ruled. Similarly the Judge could determine whether, in her informed opinion, rehabilitation rather than punishment was a proper sentencing goal.
However, three justices: Chief Justice Reiber, Justices Johnson and Skoglund agreed with Delaoz that a sentence with an equal minimum and maximum was illegal. Vermont has an indeterminate sentencing law, meaning there must be a minimum and a maximum sentence. Consequently the Court cannot “fix’ the term of imprisonment. The majority ruled that discretion is left to the parole board to determine a release date after the minimum has been served, because it can evaluate whether an inmate has successfully completed rehabilitation programs in prison. Allowing this process fosters a successful return of an offender to the community, a correction goal of humane treatment that fosters human dignity, the Court ruled.
The Majority did not rule how great the difference between minimum and the maximum sentence must be, but implies there must be some chance for early release based on prison rehabilitation programs. This 3-2 decision (Dooley and Burgess dissenting) gives prisoners a chance, and curtails the authority of “hanging” judges. State v Delaoz 2010 Vt. 65
